Sammlungspolitik, Social Imperialism and the Navy Law of 1898 1 
I
A mounting body of new research concerning the structure of German politics before 1914 is rapidly becoming available 2 . Having first defined itself by a vigorous critique of established interpretations, moreover, this new work itself now contains the seeds of an alternative orthodoxy, whose central thesis is the continuity of bourgeois politics between the 1870's and 1918 and, more ambitiously, from Bismarck to Hitler. For theoretical inspiration its exponents have drawn heavily upon the writings of Eckart Kehr, a previously neglected radical democrat who stood firmly outside the mainstream of German historiography in the 1920's s . The key concept yielded by Kehr is that of Sammlungspolitik 4 . Put simply, this meant the attempt to unite all so-called "national", antisocialist forces in a common front against democratic reform. Historically, it became the rallying-cry of a protectionist and anti-socialist bloc, the political expression of an economic alliance between heavy industry and agriculture. Kehr developed this concept in a detailed analysis of the two Navy Bills of 1897-1898 and 1899-1900. By investigating the reactions of the classes, interests and parties to the government's naval programme, he hoped to reveal their basic attitudes towards the social status quo and the possibility of political change -to draw "a cross-section through the domestic-political, social and ideological foundations of German imperialism", as he put it 5 . In using the naval question as the vehicle for a structural analysis rather than a chronological one, however, Kehr provides little conception of the dynamic of events which initially generated the policy of Sammlungspolitik in the summer of 1897. Sammlungspolitik appears as a system of economic and political compensations, a symbiotic reciprocity of social forces, pragmatically determined by a succession of responses to the compulsion of entrenched interests, rather than the careful rationalisation or creation of policy-makers. But despite the absence of detailed discussion of the particular 1 political juncture of 1897 in Kehr's writings, this has not prevented a highly schematic version of these events from developing around certain of his statements. The broad outlines of this interpretation can be easily identified. Sammlungspolitik is to be identified with the political position developed by the Prussian Finance Minister, Johannes v. Miquel, in the summer of 1897. It emerged from two programmatic statements, one in Solingen on the 15. 7. 1897 and one in the Prussian Landtag on the 23. 7. 1897®. They were delivered as part of a farreaching ministerial reconstruction and constituted a first official declaration of policy by the new government. Essentially, they asserted the "great community of interest" between agriculture and industry and represented an obvious attempt to conciliate the agrarian demands for greater state protection. In this sense the changes in the executive marked a clear turn to the right and a decisive reaction against the liberal economic policies of the previous years. The government was to be supplied with a firm base in the Reichstag by re-forming the Bismarckian Kartell, the socioeconomic precondition for which was a new rapprodiement between heavy industry and agriculture. Sammlungspolitik, a term which seems to have been coined by Miquel in the second of his two speeches, was the slogan devised for this purpose. A crucial step in the realisation of the objective was taken between July and September 1897 when a consultative committee was set up in the Reich Office of the Interior, in which representatives of industry, trade and agriculture could participate in the formulation of commercial policy. The co-operation of heavy industry and agriculture was facilitated by the offer of economic incentives (naval expansion and higher grain tariffs) and the fear of socialism (electoral advances by Social Democracy and increased unionisation). This new alliance of the propertied classes was directed consciously at the working class, and new legal restrictions were to be placed on the Social Democrats and their unions. In order to increase the support of the Kartell parties (Conservatives, Free Conservatives and National Liberals) in the coming elections of 1898, the conventional view continues, an aggressive foreign policy was proclaimed through the construction of a large battlefleet and the slogan of Weltpolitik. This elaborate compromise culminated in the collaboration of the Centraiverband Deutscher Industrieller (CVDI) and the Deutscher Landwirtsdiaftsrat (DLR), together with the parties to which they were generally affiliated, for the passage of new grain tariffs in 1902 7 .
In the first instance, therefore, Sammlungspolitik was a governmental strategy, conceived in the summer of 1897 by the leading elements in the Prussian Ministry of State, pushed through a series of ministerial discussions in the autumn, and implemented in the elections of 1898. Miquel did not, of course, bring his idea into a complete vacuum, and was able to draw upon a large body of existing ideas. The belief that a coalition of industrial and agrarian capital was the political constellation most appropriate to the preservation of the PrussianGerman state drew its pedigree from Bismarck's political reconstruction of 1878-79, and the ideological content of Sammlungspolitik in 1897-98 was a product of this formative period 8 . Its rhetoric was derived quite consciously from Bismarckian precedents 9 . In this way Miquel's policy grew out of ia previous historical experience and could relate to a large body of political doctrine. Moreover, if strong links existed with Bismarck's "solidarity bloc' of 1878-79, then the recent work of Dirk Stegmann has demonstrated that a similar continuity may be identified between 1897 and a later Sammlungspolitik immediately before 1914. Not only was the political debate of 1913-14 couched in the vocabulary of 10 , but the exponents of a new Sammlung also readied back beyond Miquel to Bismarck in their search for historical legitimacy and an allegedly unbroken right-wing tradition Stegmann argues that this lineage lends an overall unity to the entire epodi of the second Reich 12 : "The ideology of Sammlung appears, in fact, as the key concept for an understanding of the socio-historical development of the Kaiserreich after 1879. It describes, in striking form, a 'model' of political self-understanding which defined the politics of the ruling social strata in complete continuity until the break of 1918.° He defines Sammlungspolitik, therefore, as the "compromise-ideology of the ruling strata of industry and agriculture, with its basis in the common ... antiliberal and anti-socialist calculation' 13 . A firm coalition of heavy industry and big agriculture, rigidly committed to the preservation of the authoritarian monarchical state as a necessary bulwark against democratic change, remained a constant in German politics from Bismarck until the Revolution of 1918. Stegmann's work, therefore, contains a powerful statement of continuity in relation to German politics before 1918. He argues, for instance, that after 1897, "despite occasional differences, there was never any cause to renounce the alliance of interests" forged by Miquel 14 . Its "solid phalanx" remained firm and unshaken throughout the following decades 15 . The stability was overriding, and stronger than all temporary tremors on its surface, such as the conflicts over the Canal Bill im 1899 and the tariffs in 1900-02. Thus, when describing the foundation of the Vaterlandspartei in 1917, Stegmann says: "the old Kartell of 1897, newly formed in 1913, lived on unchanged" 1β . From these remarks it will be clear that the period between Miquel's proclamation of Sammlungspolitik in 1897 and the successful passage of the new tariff settlement in 1902 occupies a key position in the analysis. After the confusion following Bismarck's dismissal, during which Caprivi and certain of his ministers seemed to be questioning the primacy of the forces represented by the Sammlung, this period saw a definition of policy, a perfection of tactics and a coalescence of forces 8 See W. Sauer: Das Problem des deutschen Nationalstaats. In: Wehler: Sozialgesdiidite, pp. 407 to 436, and Rosenberg.
• E. g., Schutz der nationalen Arbeit, Kräftigung eines gesunden Mittelstandes, Kampf gegen den Umsturz, Zusammenschluß aller nationalen Elemente, Gutgesinnter, Reichsfreunde, etc. 10 See, for instance, the press discussion in the spring of 1914, cited by Stegmann, p. 348 f. 11 See the press discussion of the Kartell der schaffenden Stände in 1913, cited ibid., p. 387 f. 12 Ibid., p. 13.
which then determined the course of German politics, Stegmann argues, "in complete continuity until the break of 1918" 17 .
In the light of recent interest in the idea of Sammlungspolitik, it is surprising that not much detailed work has been done on the critical years of 1897-1902. Although several important monographs on problems of Wilhelmine history have recently appeared, most have examined the genesis and efficacy of Miquel's policy only incidentally 18 . Stegmann's own discussion of this period is little more than an extended introduction to the main body of his analysis, whidi relates to developments after 1909 1β . Other research has also concentrated on this later phase 20 . What we now have is a generalisation concerning the nature of Sammlungspolitik, which has been developed from a detailed examination of two stages in its history, that of 1878-79 and that of 1909-18. This generalisation has also been applied to a third period, that of 1897-1909, without a similar basis of detailed research. Nobody has tried, for instance, to examine Sammlungspolitik in the concrete -i. e. in the movements of the political parties and in the elections of 1898. This lack of substance seems to be even more serious in view of the pivotal role of these years in the overall analysis. A paradoxical situation has emerged in which a concept developed in the study of one period has been utilised profitably for an understanding of events both before and after, and, correspondingly refined and deepened, has been brought back to its original context as a more hardened generalisation. A fuller understanding of Bismarckian politics and the domestic prelude to the First World War have thus created a propensity to diagnose problems in the intermediate period with more certainty than current understanding actually justifies. Most discussions of the Sammlung of 1897 are based on a set of assumptions drawn mainly from the invaluable but incomplete work of Kehr and the detailed findings of researdi on other periods. This has led to generalisations which have concentrated on certain aspects and neglected others, with results which can be misleading. In particular, Kehr's polemical use of the formula Primat der Innenpolitik has inspired the development of a concept of 'social imperialism" which has been loosely and uncritically applied to Miquel is described as "the diversion of revolutionary elements into colonial policy". The Sammlung II Α common misconception concerning the nature of Sammlungspolitik in 1897 resides in the role which is normally attributed to Tirpitz's naval programme in its inception. This is a classic example, in fact, of the way in which parts of Edkart Kehr's thesis have hardened into a dogma. One of the points on whidi previous historians have been most insistant is that the inauguration of German Weltpolitik and the corollary of vastly increased naval armaments are to be considered as an integral part of the political system conceived by Miquel in 1897. In particular, the plans for a large navy have been described as the positive incentive whidi helped draw heavy industry into coalition with the agrarians. In this view Sammlungspolitik is to be regarded as a means of defending the structure of the state by setting up a framework of conciliation from which heavy industry and agriculture eadi derived necessary sectional benefits. The revival of Bismarck's alliance of 1879, after its period of recession under Caprivi, was made possible by a series of reciprocal concessions and compensations. In Kehr's classic formulation of this thesis, Miquel's Sammlungspolitik had a
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.. three-fold tendency: for industry the fleet, Weltpolitik and expansion; for the agrarians the tariffs and the upholding of the social supremacy of the Conservatives; and as a consequence of this social and economic compromise, for the Centre the political hegemony." Kehr goes further than this, in fact, and describes the naval programme, and the Weltpolitik of which this was a part, as the leading weapon of the ruling class in their attempts to ward off the demands of the working class for social and political emancipation. A large fleet was regarded both as a necessary instrument of further economic growth and as a potential source of popular support for the parties of the Sammlung. Subsequent commentary on the events of 1897-1902 has made little effort to reflect critically upon the validity of Kehr's theoretical insights, and his classic definition has provided the conceptual framework into which recent researchers have normally inserted their findings for these years. Following Kehr, therefore, an imperialist calculation of this kind has been described on many occasions as the dominant feature of the strategy proclaimed by Miquel in July 1897 2S . But if we move from these generalisations to a careful examination of the available evidence, it appears that the political function of the naval programme has been overstressed in Miquel's thinking. If naval of 1897 has often been described as the attempt to bind together Weltpolitik and anti-socialism in a single strategy. The sole basis of this view seems to be a letter from Tirpitz to Stosch in December 1895 (A. v. Tirpitz: Erinnerungen. Berlin 1927, p. 52) (cit. Tirpitz: Erinnerungen). This has been quoted many times in support of a simplistic theory of "manipulated social imperialism' (e.g. Wehler: Bismarck, p. 498; Witt: Finanzpolitik, p. 59; Stegmann, p. 109). It certainly betrays an important train of thought, but cannot be used as the basis for a whole thesis concerning the nature of Sammlungspolitik in 1897. One important need in the current discussion is a detailed analysis of popular imperialism. But a considerable advance will not be achieved until the definition of social imperialism is taken beyond that expansion was seen to possess this clear political function, for instance, or was demanded by the CVDI as the price of its co-operation with agriculture, or at least as an economic necessity in its own right, then this might naturally be expected to have appeared prominently in discussions of Sammlungspolitik in 1897 and 1898. Unfortunately, the evidence for this is slight. Miquel made no reference to the political utility of the naval question in his two speeches of the 15. and 25. 7. 1897 which must be taken as the twin texts for the proclamation of the new strategy 24 . In each major discussion of policy in the Ministry of State no sudi function was ascribed to the naval programme 25 . Far from wishing to incorporate an ambitious Navy Bill into his Sammlungspolitik, Miquel, after a period of equivocation, tried to exclude it from his plans as completely as possible 26 . In the critical discussions with Eduard Capelle in Wiesbaden in August 1897, Miquel constantly emphasised the dangers of introducing a large bill before the next elections -scarcely evidence that such a bill played any constructive role in his calculations. Miquel raised two basic objections to the proposals advanced by Tirpitz. On the one hand, he argued that the Centre, which supplied the key to the Reichstag majority, would never accept a Bill which removed some of the latter's already limited budgetary controls and carried such large costs. The Reichstag majority would never agree to its own constitutional emasculation, and if matters came to a dissolution even candidates sympathetic to the Navy might be compelled to oppose Tirpitz's financial proposals to secure re-election 27 . Capelle commented that Miquel constantly returned to this point 2β . When Tirpitz indicated that he stood or fell on the issue, Miquel still reiterated the argument. Moreover, if a dissolution failed to produce the necessary majority for the Bill, the government would be faced with a situation similar to the constitutional conflict of the 1860's. In such a deadlock there would be no choice but a Staatsstreich and a dangerous leap in the dark. As Miquel said: "Nobody can say what would have come out of the Prussian conflict (of the 1860's) if the war had not arrived 29 ."
The second and more important source of opposition feared by Miquel, however, was that of the agrarians. This was the point at whidi Tirpitz's plans for a big Navy Bill threatened to clash with Miquel's own grand design for a reconciliation of industry and agriculture. An ambitious scheme for the growth of the Navy, with its stress on the protection of foreign markets, keeping the trade routes open, accelerating industrial growth and helping food supplies to beat an enemy blockade, threatened to make it harder rather than easier to reconcile the embittered agrarian movement. An intensive naval propaganda stressing the value of a big fleet as a function of Germany's expanding industrial and commercial interests would play straight into the hands of agrarian demagogues anxious to exploit any suggestion that "rural", "traditional" or "Prussian" values were being submerged in the process of industrialisation. Miquel repeatedly emphasised to Capelle that Conservative support for the Bill would be secured only with great difficulty 30 . The most he would concede was that enthusiasm for the Navy might help to integrate the popular base of the Kartell parties more tightly together. But Miquel was firm behind the basic demand: the propaganda for the Bill must at all costs "proceed with the utmost caution", and "any suggestion of offence" to agrarian susceptibilities must be avoided. The "broad economic arguments" in favour of the fleet were "not opportune" 31 .
In the forthcoming elections the Navy Bill would provide a "decisive slogan under no circumstances", for "economic demands override everything else". "Agriculture" and "commercial treaties" were to provide the supreme issues, although the naval question might provide a "useful national ferment" S2 . plans for the co-operation of industry and agriculture. The two questions -a new Sammlungspolitik and the implementation of the "Tirpitz-Plan" -were kept formally and tactically quite separate. The conventional model of the interdependence of naval expansion and tariff settlement as the twin components of a tactical unity, therefore, does not seem to fit the facts in 1897-98. The argument has recently been given a new twist by the work of Volker Berghahn. In the course of a long and illuminating analysis of Tirpitz's naval policy between 1897 and 1908, Berghahn has made some important comments on the nature of Sammlungspolitik in 1897-1902 3B . He has since repeated them and hardened their implications 89 . He criticises existing work for placing too much emphasis on Miquel's role as the ardiitect of Sammlungspolitik in 1897. He argues that the basis of Miquel's idea was too narrow as it rested on the co-operation of only one sector of industry and big agriculture, whidi could not command a majority in the Reichstag. Consequently, Tirpitz put forward an alternative proposal -an alliance with a larger base, whidi could take in the Centre, which Berghahn claims was explicitly excluded from consideration by Miquel, broader sections of the urban bourgeoisie than had previously been possible, and possibly even the working class in the distant future. To fulfil this goal, Tirpitz hoped to use the fleet "as a positive integrative factor' 40 . For Berghahn, therefore, Sammlungspolitik began "at the same time with and through the construction of the fleet" 41 . He sees the policy of naval expansion as a response to a "latent crisis* in the structure of the state after the fall of Bismarck, in whidi the traditional ruling groups tried to defend their power against rising social forces 42 . In a big navy policy the government found an ideal means of preventing a democratisation of the system, for with its help it became possible to introduce a new Sammlung of agrarians and industrialists: ".... in the fleet there finally seemed to have been found, after a long period of crisis, a vehicle for the introduction of a new period of stabilisation" 4S . Berghahn describes this alleged strategy as a more advanced form of Sammlungspolitik, brought forward in the summer of 1897 by Tirpitz and Hohenlohe in opposition to that of Miquel 44 . The idea had emerged by "1897 at the latest" and "in the end won the upper hand over the 'small' solution of Miquel and became superimposed upon it" 45 . Berghahn calls the resultant constellation, whidi appeared in two historical variants, the so-called "Kardorff-majority" of 1902 and the Biilow-Block, a "large" Sammlung, as opposed to the "small" Sammlung of Miquel. This amounts to an important revision of the view presented by Stegmann and most other historians of the period 4e . It also represents a rather unorthodox use of the term Sammlungspolitik, whidi has normally been identified exclusively with the particular policies announced by Miquel in July 1897 -namely, economic protection and reactionary anti-socialism. As indicated above, these policies were also part of a specific political tradition in Germany, that which received its baptism in Bismarck's settlement of 1878-79 and which was anchored in the class alliance of heavy industrial and agrarian capital. The term, as it was devised and used in 1897 and the following years, therefore, had a singular meaning and denoted a very specific set of demands. In June 1897 these were well articulated by Wilhelm II during a moment of demagogic clarity: "Protection of the national labour of all productive estates, strengthening of a healthy Mittelstand, unconditional destruction of all revolution, and the heaviest punishment for anyone who tries to prevent a neighbour from giving his labour This crucial specificity imposes important requirements on the movements and manifestations which the term may legitimately be used to characterise. In particular, the policy of große Sammlung whidi Berghahn attributes to Tirpitz must be shown to have clearly fitted the interests and needs of those forces which the concept of Sammlung alone connotes. Yet if we try to identify the political views and ambitions of Tirpitz in these critical years of 1897-1902, it becomes plain that the available evidence cannot support the far-reaching claims which have been made for them. Moreover, and more important, an examination of the actual operation of the naval policy, the actual forces to whidi it appealed and the actual energies it released, will reveal that a strategy basing itself primarily and predominantly on the naval programme, far from serving to fortify the existing order, implied and partially realised an important challenge to its stability. A preliminary comment, which must cast serious doubts on the strength of Berghahn's critique of Stegmann, concerns the role of the Centre in the attempts to reconstruct the Sammlung. The claim that Miquel explicitly excluded this party from his plans constitutes Berghahn's most important observation on the narrowness and weakness of his conception 4e . Any such attempt to build a majority without the Centre, either for the passage of the tariffs or for the elections of 1898, would have displayed a colossal political naivety, and all the evidence, in fact, shows that Miquel fully appreciated this. The decision to reach an accommodation with the party, moreover, was a logical and inevitable consequence of Miquel's policy in 1897-98, particularly of his decisive rejection of plans to revise the constitution 49 . A definitive decision against Staatsstreich determined one in favour of co-operation with the Centre, for the only alternative to the latter, given the balance of forces in the Reidistag, was an abandonment of the constitutional framework which made it necessary. These options encapsulated the political dilemma of the government in the spring and summer of 1897, when the conventional political process was heavily overshadowed by the threat of Staatsstreich. June and July 1897, and was finally resolved by the decision "to go with the Centre " 50 .
By June 1897 Miquel had decided that he could only co-operate in a new Ministry "if it was resolved to come to an arrangement with the Centre", for "without the concurrence of the Centre I consider a successful domestic policy to be impossible " 51 . In his first meeting with Capelle in Wiesbaden Miquel stressed that the Centre would be "decisive for the success of any plan " 52 . In the second meeting he was even more emphatic: "The Centre is the master of the situation 53 .° Moreover, Miquel and his close ally Posadowsky together played a crucial role in ensuring the support of the party for the Navy Bill. He advised Tirpitz to take close feeling with Lieber, and himself held two vital meetings with the latter on the 10. and 16. 8. 1897
54 . He also suggested making contact with Kardinal Kopp, and himself conducted negotiations with him during the autumn 55 . In the Ministry of State on the 6. 10. 1897 he proposed the abolition of § 2 of the Jesuit Law to facilitate an understanding, and in February and March 1898 again played an important role in securing the passage of the Navy Bill 5e . Similarly, Miquel was careful to ensure that the key position of the Centre was taken account of in the government's guidelines for the elections 57 . There is no doubt that Miquel's personal relationship with Lieber was a difficult one, but this must not obscure his recognition of the need for co-operation 58 . The limited success of his overtures in 1898 was a product of forces beyond his own, Tirpitz's or any other minister's control -namely, the complex and conflicting requirements of the party's diverse social base, and its opportunist pursuit of party-political hegemony. Tirpitz could offer no alternative prescription for winning the party's support: a third of the Centre deputies voted against the first Navy Bill, and at the time of the second in 1899-1900 Tirpitz was similarly unable to exert a decisive influence over the tactical idiosyncracies of the fraction's politics 59 . Moreover, Miquel fell in 1901, not through the successful assertion of some alternative strategy by Tirpitz and Biilow eo , but as the victim of the heightened contradictions of interest between industry and agriculture whidi he had been unable to overcome. After his departure Bülow brought forward no new strategy, but merely began reconstructing the old one. The Kardorff-majority which emerged from his efforts in 1902 was merely the logical realisation of the goal formulated by Miquel in 1897 -namely, "to establish the economic policies of Prince Bismarck from 1879, and therefore under all circumstances to win the Centre β1 ."
Purely in terms of its party-political structure, therefore, the constellation advocated by Miquel seems indistinguishable from that which Berghahn attributes to Tirpitz and Biilow: a reconstruction of the Kartell buttressed by a looser association with the Centre. Moreover, there appears to be little evidence to support the view that Tirpitz tried to advance his naval programme as an "innenpolitische Krisenstrategie" in Berghahn's sense -that it acted as the "vehicle" for the introduction of a new period of stability, or more concretely, that it paved the way consciously for the tariff settlement in 1902. Tirpitz himself gave no indication that he saw his plans as part of a larger political strategy or that he held any conception of the unity of industry and agriculture in the specific sense implied by the idea of Sammlung. The many discussions he conducted around the fortunes of the Navy Bill were all concerned with matters internal to the question of naval expansion. The aim of the Navy Office in 1897-98 was to construct a majority for the passage of the Bill; there is no evidence that Tirpitz wished to use that majority for other political purposes, such as the tariff settlement, or to institutionalise it in the manner suggested by Berghahn β2 . There is little indication, in fact, that Tirpitz himself saw beyond the naval issue in any coherent way at all. In his own correspondence in the summer and autumn of 1897, where the Bill was discussed intensively in all its aspects, the possible function of the Navy Bill in a strategy of Sammlung played no role whatsoever. The discussion revolved exclusively around the tactics necessary to bring through the Navy Bill as such. At no point during the critical ministerial discussions, when Tirpitz had to defend his plans against the strong scepticism of his colleagues, did he suggest that these could lay the foundations for a broader long-term strategy es . It is certainly possible that Tirpitz held a strong belief in the social-imperialist potential of the naval programme, and Berghahn has gathered some evidence to suggest that this was so 64 . But we need far more than this to demonstrate that in 1897 Tirpitz regarded this as the key to the construction of a stable political coalition for general purposes extending beyond his own departmental concerns. No evidence has been published to suggest that Tirpitz projected sudi an idea in discussions of high policy between 1897 and 1902 or that he advanced it consciously as an alternative to the strategy of Miquel. Moreover, those political views which can be attributed to Tirpitz on the basis of the available evidence suggest that the ideological content of his naval plans was singularly unsuited to re-unite the fragmented Bismarckian coalition. Tirpitz's entire philosophy was guided by a belief in a "vitally necessary, worldwide expansion of German economic influence" e5 . This was the indispensable backcloth to his naval ideas, for which the "inter-dependence of economy and seapower" 66 was axiomatic: the Navy had a vital interest in the development of overseas trade "because its existence depends on the latter's prosperity" β7 . Tirpitz's undoubted commitment to the inevitability, the desirability and above all the actuality of Germany's transformation from an agricultural into an industrial nation had important implications ® 8
. An invocation of a largescale historical perspective of social and economic changes and the definition of the fleet as a function of this economic development would expose the tension which lay at the heart of the governmental coalition of heavy-industrial and agrarian interests -that between the exponents of an ongoing process of industrialisation and traditionalist conservatives who refused to accept the disappearance of pre-industrial values 69 . From those factors of German economic life which Tirpitz listed the Navy as serving -sea-trade, export-industry, deep-sea fishing, colonies -agriculture was conspicuously and necessarily absent 70 . For Tirpitz, "Germany's development into an industrial and trading nation" was "irresistable like a law of nature". It was impossible "to damm", for "the process would flow on regardless". Agriculture could be maintained if the diance arose, but it was "not part of the great necessary development" 71 . These views contrasted starkly with those of agrarian conservatives. The latter easily grasped the implications of the naval programme which Tirpitz brought before the Reichstag in 1897. As one agrarian stated in opposing the Bill in its third reading: this was "just one more step along the path trodden by the disastrous policy of commercial treaties". Its passage would "lead us still further along the path of development towards a state of industrialists and wholesale traders*. He ended: "The decline of our German agriculture will be the decline of our German nation, of our German fatherland; we don't want an industrial state, but want to remain what we were in olden times, an agricultural state 72 ." The sources suggest that Tirpitz himself followed through the logic of his views in 1897-1900 by seeking the support of those groups with a strong ideological commitment to the concept of the Industriestaat and a corresponding hostility to that of the Agrarstaat. He voiced his mistrust of Miquel's economic policyand therefore of the policy of Sammlung -at a very early stage. He pointed out that the decision "to inaugurate a commercial policy which is likely to dimnish our trade and export-industry substantially" constituted "a contradiction with this and for that matter with any other Navy Bill". If Miquel's protectionist plans were implemented, "any success" for the naval programme "would appear to me to be impossible, for the fleet is after all a function of our sea-interests" 7S . The tenuous compatibility of the naval programme with any genuine strategy of Sammlung between 1897 and 1902 could scarcely be more sharply stated. Moreover, at this same time the anti-protectionist, anti-agrarian, anti-Sammlung tendencies which resided indisputably in Tirpitz's efforts to wring every ounce of propagandist value out of the economic motivation of the Navy Bill came clearly to the fore in the activities of his advisers. August v. Heeringen, for instance, proposed the formation of an industrial-commercial pressure group to further the Bill under the name of "Association for the Protection of Foreign Trade" 71 . Shortly afterwards he urged Tirpitz that it was important to combine the campaign for the Bill with the movement in support of the existing commercial treaties 75 . The overall political context accentuates the meaning of these ideas. In August 1897 an attempt to organise economic opinion for the defence of the trading treaties actually materialised in the shape of the Centraistelle zur Vorbereitung von Handelsverträgen 7β . It represented mainly the exporting industries fundamentally opposed to the re-introduction of high agricultural tariffs, was explicitly anti-agrarian and was boycotted by the CVDI 77 . This was the first appearance of an embryonic counter-coalition to that of the classic heavy-industrial-agrarian Sammlung. It documented adequately the convergence of the naval plans with the attempts to create a focus of opposition to the new Sammlungspolitik. It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that the CVDI, which was in the process of committing itself to a revision of the commercial treaties, proved at first hard to engage for Heeringen's plans, which were finally realised in the Kaiserhof demonstration of January 1898
7β . This, the classic manifestation of those forces successfully mobilised by the Navy Bill, revealed both the apparent strength and the actual weakness of the naval issue as a leading instrument of government politics. On the one hand, it seemed capable of bringing together groups who were normally separated by deep divisions of political principle -protectionists and free traders, large and small-scale industry, heavy and light-industrial interests, right and left-wing liberals. In this way the naval issue seemed to offer a basis for the union of the bourgeois parties. As Adolph Woermann said in his address in the Kaiserhof, the fleet was a "symbol of the future unity of Germany" 7 ®. But on the other hand, it was equally clear that this was a juncture on one issue only, which could not be repeated on others. The problems which beset the organisation of the meeting had been an indication of this, and the bitter recriminations over tariff reform several months later, accentuated dramatically in the elections of June 1898, revealed that the much-vaunted "unifying-power" of the naval idea had a very tenuous reality. Above all, the spokesmen of organised agriculture had been conspicuously absent from the sponsors of a demonstration which they could not fail to view with suspicion. Moreover, the most enthusiastic patrons of the idea had been attracted not least by the possibilities of converting the naval issue into the vehicle for a strong anti-agrarian front 80 . The political constellation briefly glimpsed in the Kaiserhof meeting had a clear orientation, whidi "threatened to tear apart the entire network" so carefully woven by Miquel 81 . One agrarian statement put this more sharply: 
There is much evidence that both Tirpitz himself and his closest collaborators recognised and consciously cultivated the anti-agrarian potential of the naval issue. As Heeringen pointed out for the benefit of his successor, "sea-interests and the efforts of the agrarians" were incompatible, and this clash would inevitably grow worse during the debate over new tariffs 83 . As the central domestic-political contradiction between "agrarianism and industrialism" became more acute the Navy Office must make a clear choice in favour of the "industrial direction" and a strong effort to win the support of those "leftist" forces in German industry which "saw in all agrarian efforts something hostile to themselves". Heeringen, like Tirpitz, believed in the desirable long-term necessity of the victory of industrialism. During 1901 his successor Hollweg went further and recommended the positive intervention of the Navy Office in the tariff question in order to strengthen the exporting interests in their struggle against the agrarians. He argued that the Navy Office must base itself increasingly and unequivocally on the side of the "leftist" elements, for the key political question was whether "we can become master of this opponent"
84 . This was reflected in the specific negotiations conducted with the political parties for the passage of the two Navy Bills. In 1897-90 Tirpitz devoted special care to the cultivation of the Freisinnige Vereinigung 85 . The same concern was reflected in his relations with the trading communities of Hamburg and Bremen, and with individuals like, Ballin, Woermann, Hönig and above all Ernst v. Halle 8e . In 1899-1900 this was even more marked. The second Bill was passed this time with the unreserved support of the Freisinnige Vereinigung, and the Navy Office had strengthened and broadened its contacts with the bourgeois left. To the older contacts, moreover, had been added new ones with socialreformist academics and individuals on the fringe of the National-Sozialer Verein 87 . There is mudi evidence of Tirpitz's close ideological affinity with the Barth-Rickert left liberals at this time, and this association must be defined as qualitatively different from that with the Centre. The latter was determined above all by parliamentary expedience: the naval programme held little attractive power for the party, and the ongoing use of threats and cajolery could not prevent between a quarter and a third of its deputies from opposing the Bills in both 1898 and 1900 88 .
In reality, however, Tirpitz left his own position ambiguous and equivocal. Berghahn has pointed out very well, for instance, the anti-parliamentary, antidemocratic dynamic of his naval programme, and there is no doubt that he was a convinced supporter of monarchy and authoritarian rule ββ . But on the other hand, he was equally clearly a firm supporter of industrial growth and argued that the agricultural sector could be protected only in subordination to this principle eo . The tension between these two components in his ideological make-up made him reluctant to embrace the full implications of the proposition that "everything which goes by sea is anti-agrarian and antiJunker" -namely, the necessity of a decisive break with the tradition of Sammlung and a radical overhaul of the structure of the state 91 . Tirpitz was thus a contradictory figure in many ways very similar to Caprivi, but unlike the latter was able to survive in office behind the shelter of his limited departmental preoccupations. But although at this stage Tirpitz personally was able to evade the problem of resolving this ideological tension, this could not prevent the wider political reverberations of his policies, which posed an implicit threat to the cohesion of the Sammlung. The dynamic released by these in 1899-1900, for instance, was strong enough to force even Pan-Germans like Ernst Hasse into an anti-agrarian stance by submitting them to its political logic ® 2 . The tensions engendered by the campaign for the second Bill were worked out most dramatically in the crisis of the Flottenverein in November-December 1899, when an entrenched leadership closely observant of the dictates of Sammlungspolitik was unseated, with the deep complicity of Tirpitz, by a populist coalition of strongly anti-agrarian complexion 9S . On the resolution of this crisis one supporter of the Sammlung warned the partisans of "national" policies to "make sure that freetrading and socialist contraband is not smuggled in under the flag of the naval movement"
94 . This was edioed sarcastically by Viktor Schweinburg, the unseated Secretary of the Flotten verein: "It would have been so nice if in the shade of the Navy Bill free-trading weeds could be sown in the corn of the policy of Schutz der nationalen Arbeit β5 ." It was here that Tirpitz came closest to grasping the full import of his own policies ββ . The strength of these partially realised tendencies, moreover, were only the logical outcome of the principle evinced by Capelle in January 1898: "Navy and liberal idea belong together. A strong popular movement for the Navy also strengthens the movement for the commercial treaties 97 This discussion is important, for it helps to explain why the naval issue could never provide the rallying banner for a new Sammlung in 1897 and the following years and why Tirpitz could never become its high priest. Contrary to the conventional view, it appers to have been difficult to use Weltpolitik to build a new Sammlung, for it released energies and mobilised forces whidi were hostile to the essential principles of Sammlungspolitik. Moreover, this discrepancy between the political reality of 1897-1902 and the received views concerning the function of naval policy in the government politics of these years becomes more striking if we examine the concept which has normally been used to explain that function -namely, "social imperialism". This has been defined by HansUlrich Wehler as "the diversion outwards of internal tensions and forces of change in order to preserve the social and political status quo", and a "defensive ideology" against "the disruptive effects of industrialisation on the social and economic structure of Germany" ββ . Using Bismarck's colonial policy as his model, Wehler describes a consistant attempt to use popular enthusiasm for foreign policy as "a long-term integrative factor which helped stabilise an anachronistic social and power structure". He has claimed that mass support for expansion abroad was successfully used to "block domestic progress" and "social and political emancipation"
It was an effective "technique of rule" applied by Bismarck, by Miquel, Bülow and Tirpitz, and later by Hitler, to defeat "the advancing forces of parliamentarisation and democratisation" 10°. It was responsible for reconciling the working class to the status quo and the victory of reformism in the SPD, and its consequences were so far-reaching that German history from Bismarck to Hitler may be defined in terms of a "red thread of social imperialism"
101 . This definition has been accepted by Berghahn, Stegmann and most other historians 102 .
This definition of social imperialism, particularly when applied to the Navy Bill of 1898 and the inception of Weltpolitik, contains a serious confusion. It has been defined in terms of a reactionary attempt to stave off social and political reform. This determined a rigid hostility to both socialist and left liberal demands, to both workers' and parliamentary control. But in seeking to identify the idea with the perpetuation of authoritarian structures and an intransigent rejection of reform, Wehler has ignored the existence of a social imperialism which, on the contrary, willingly embraced the need for reform. In calling social imperialism the defence of "an anachronistic social and power structure" against democratisation and social reform, Wehler has obscured the fact that an extremely coherent social-imperialist impulse came from precisely those elements which were starting to demand democratisation and social reform. In the current discussion, in fact, the term has been used to describe two fundamentally separate conceptions of the domestic-political utility of imperialist expansion. This discussion has concealed two distinct variants of social imperialism in Germanythat described by Wehler and Berghahn, conventionally accepted, in which expansion abroad was used to prevent reform at home, and a second form, in which expansion abroad was combined with reform at home. close adviser to Tirpitz and a powerful exponent of a reformist social imperialism, put it: "one group wants to divert interest from the expansion of social legislation at home, while the other hopes to benefit its ambitious social policy at home precisely by means of a strong power politics abroad 103 ." The existence of a social imperialism bound to reformist perspectives must introduce a serious qualification into the way in which the idea has previously been used. It is fundamentally mistaken, for instance, to define German history in terms of a dichotomy between a "social-imperialist" direction and a "socialreformist" one, when the social-reformists were themselves operating on the basis of a ruthlessly lucid social-imperialist synthesis of "power abroad and reform at home" 104 . More concretely, this confusion of definitions has fostered a misinterpretation of the function of the naval programme at the turn of the century. Previous historians have used the idea exclusively to characterise the ambitions of the defenders of the status quo and the exponents of Sammlung. It has already been suggested above that a political exploitation of the two Navy Bills stood at variance with sudi aims, however, and an exploration of the diverse sources of social-imperialist calculations between 1897 and 1902 will strengthen this proposition.
Volker Berghahn, for example, has suggested that "the naval policy was potentially suited also to manoeuvre the ... fourth estate in the direction of the powerpolitical status quo. With the help of a powerful fleet... the monardily wanted to create a rising standard of living for all, through whidi the German workers would be better placed and satisfied materially. It was hoped that an economically contented working population could be led into the state without it being necessary to change the latter's received structures of rule 10S ." An early "politics of economic growth" is a crucial feature of the political goals which Berghahn ascribes to Tirpitz. Yet an analysis of the real political context demonstrates that the adoption of such a course determined forms of action and political alliances which Tirpitz, as the agent of "Prussia-Germany and a strong monarchy 105a , could never have taken. The starting-point in Berghahn's whole analysis is the attempt to preserve an existing social order, an essential part of whidi was the special position of the Junker. Yet the attempt to advance the working class materially, whidi he attributes to the defenders of the status quo, posed, in the form it whidi it may actually be found in 1897-1902, an explicit threat to that social order. Any genuine attempt by Tirpitz or Bülow to implement such a policy would have driven them into political dependence on those forces aiming at the destruction of the heavy-industrial-agrarian Sammlung rather than its perpetuation -i. e. left liberals around Theodor Barth and Heinridi Rickert in the Freisinnige Vereinigung, and Naumann and the academic social reformers who stood close to his National-Sozialer Verein. Tirpitz may have realised this, Bülow certainly did. The latter was acutely aware of the conservative forces in the court, the bureaucracy and the army which precluded sudi a juncture. This fact has an overriding importance for an evaluation of Berghahn's analysis: the elements in 1897-1902 which actually espoused the "exploitation of the expansionist forces of the industrial economy" were the bitter critics of the Sammlung 10β .
There was a fundamental political gulf between a belief in the utility of nationalist sentiments for increasing the popular support of the Kartell parties -i.e. the concrete meaning of Wehler's notion of social imperialism in the conditions of 1897 -and the efforts of liberal imperialists to forge a novel programme of overseas expansion and far-reaching domestic reform. At the end of the 1890's a political grouping began to cohere, no less committed to the ideal of a Weltpolitik whidi could "unite the entire impetus of the nation and all its layers and overcome the internal divisions whidi threaten it" 107 , but convinced that any serious attempt to bind the working class to capitalist property relations presupposed a partial dismantlement of the repressive apparatus of the state and a degree of real social reform. These liberal imperialists at first comprised little more than a miscellany of intellectuals, engaged academics and political mavericks, but were able both to rationalise previous developments, anticipate later ones and provide a theoretical position around whidi political forces could begin to rally. Friedrich Naumann argued that nationalist exhortations, or even rising material standards might never seduce workers away from socialism by themselves; it might be necessary to combine them with a progressive social policy. Naumann and his co-thinkers began to develop an integrated programme of imperialist expansion and far-readiing domestic reforms: the first was projected as a necessity of national existence in the age of Weltpolitik, the second would help to win popular support. The systematic propagation of both would destroy the appeal of revolutionary socialism to the working class. As one exponent of this view put it: "World-policy and social policy are the two poles in which one and the same power manifests itself. The national drive abroad must be accompanied by social progress at home loe ."
Naumanns' particular achievement of the late 1890's was to develop a socialimperialist synthesis of "power abroad and reform at home", whidi would act as an alternative to the conservative Sammlungspolitik with which the idea of social imperialism has previously been identified. The demand for tax reform was the salient feature of this programme, for it was axiomatic to Naumann's politics that the destruction of agrarian privileges in Prussia was a necessary precondition for both further economic growth and working class support. His twin domestic aims -the cultivation of reformism in the labour movement and the dismantlement of the historically obsolete primacy of the Junker -led him and his political allies into a decisive confrontation wth the heavy-industrialist and agrarian supporters of Miquel's Sammlungspolitik. When he asserted that "Our bread will depend on our ships", this general commitment to an expanding industrial economy also reflected a determination to pull down the tariff walls whidi protected the Junker's status and kept bread prices high loe . Support of the fleet for Naumann and his supporters was predicated in this way on a larger view of Germany's future political development. As Max Weber, who decisively 1M influenced Naumann's world-view, put it: "Not a policy of so-called 'Sammlung' with its anti-capitalist slogans, but only a decisive pursuit of the consequences of our powerful bourgeois-industrial development can lend sense for the bourgeois class to the demand for sea-power. For the protection of ground-rents we need no fleet 110 ."
From this discussion it will have become clearer why the Navy Bill was so unsuited to rally the forces of the Sammlung, and why Miquel was so suspicious of any attempt to make the issue the centre of the government's policies in 1897: the Bills were appropriated by liberal imperialists, with the partial complicity of the Navy Office, as the vehicle for an ongoing critique of the policies of Sammlung. The naval issue threatened to provide a broad platform for the liberal opponents of agrarian protection and the stimulus for an embittered political debate which might polarise the two wings of Miquel's nascent coalition. Too great an emphasis on the naval issue threatened in this way to canalise antiagrarian sentiments. This was even more obvious in 1899-1900 than in 1897-98. The political alignments produced by the Navy Bills did not correspond to those required by a genuine Sammlungspolitik: they divided the Centre, sent a minority of agrarians into opposition, and proved attractive only to the Freisinnige Vereinigung amongst those forces not already embraced by Miquel's conception. The real effect of the naval issue in 1897-1902 was not any unifying bond between heavy industry and agriculture but the definition of an embryonic alternative to this hegemonic coalition. It provided the context within which opposing prescriptions for Germany's future economic and political development worked out their points of conflict. In particular, it helped stimulate the first signs of a future juncture between rising industries, liberal imperialists and the reformist labour bureaucracy. The failure of these forces to assert themselves against the dominant coalition at this stage and their evident political fragmentation are no argument against their existence: the crucial point is that a coherent political alternative, basing itself on the experience of the Caprivi interlude, had now been posed. The exponents of this alternative were the only politicans in 1897-1902 consistantly advocating the politics of economic growth which Berghahn claims to see in Tirpitz's naval plans. In the real circumstances of 1897-1902 an exploitation of the naval issue meant an alliance with these forces. But as Kehr said, Sammlungspolitik had nothing to do with such an alliance: it was the antithesis of a "forward-looking policy which grasped the necessity of an industrialisation of the Reich" ni . The point of these observations on the political function of the naval programme between 1897 and 1902 is to suggest that its importance for the development of a new Sammlungspolitik has been overestimated by previous historians. It is clear from the sources, for instance, that naval expansion was not a necessary and integral part of Miquel's policies in the way previously thought. In the evidence we may search in vain for any hint that ministers or politicians saw any constructive relationship between the Navy Ball and the tariff question in 1897-98, or that the former played any part in what they understood by the idea of Sammlungspolitik. Moreover, the political tendency which did draw the naval issue into a tactical unity with their domestic policies tried also take make it contin-gent on a programme of reform fundamentally inimical to the survival of the class alliance enshrined in the Samlung. In so far as Tirpitz had any wider political interests he appears to have identified himself with this incipient countercoalition rather than the Sammlung itself 112 . The only factor which distinguished the "naval coalition" from the political bloc assembled by Miquel, in fact, was the presence in the former of the Freisinnige Vereinigung. This suggests the ultimate incompatibility of a vigorous naval propaganda with a reconstructed Sammlung, and the fundamental inexpedience of the naval issue for the supporters of the latter. Later, at the time of the second Navy Bill in 1899-1900, there is no doubt that the naval issue was brought into an important tactical relationship with the impending tariff settlement, in the sense that the agrarians were willing to make their consent for the former conditional on concessions on the latter. But the combination of navy and tariffs in 1900 resulted from a confrontation with reality rather than the conscious implementation of a political blueprint, and as such constituted a disruption of the conception developed in 1897. Despite the problems created by the naval question, however, the forces of Sammlung still managed to survive and the Kardorff-majority of 1902 corresponded exactly to the political constellation envisaged by Miquel in 1897.
Ill
The concept of Sammlungspolitik, if it is to have any meaning at all, therefore, is to be identified with the political position developed by Miquel in the summer of 1897. The formation of the Wirtschaftlicher Ausschuß under official auspices in September 1897 represented a first concrete achievement for his plans for "bringing the parties together in the economic field"
113 . This consisted of five nominees each from the DLR, the CVDI and the Deutscher Handelstag (DHT) as the three recognised economic corporations, and fifteen members nominated by the government. The CVDI delegates comprised one representative of the glass industry, one from the sugar industry and three from the protection-oriented textiles industry; the five heavy-industrialists appointed by the government were also supporters of protection. In combination with the representatives of agriculture, therefore, the CVDI was able to leave the exporting interests who wanted a continuation of the Caprivi commercial treaties in a clear minority on the committee 114 . But although this body provided a necessary institutional setting for political consultation between the twin partners of a revived Sammlung -the heavy industry of the Ruhr and Silesia, the big landowners of East and West Germany -the immediate impact of its foundation must not be overestimated. A more cautious examination both of the corporate motivation of the CVDI and of the wide range of attitudes gathered within it is required. The definition of an official attitude towards the existing commercial treaties was largely a pragmatic response to new world developments -the introduction of new American tariffs and the abrogation of the English commercial treaty. Moreover, the opening of consultations with the DLR and the government over the formation of a joint committee was undertaken to forestall an earlier and poten-tially dangerous initiative from the Chemieverein and the DHT 115 . From this point of view the participation of the CVDI in the Wirtschaftlicher Aussdiuß appears more as a defensive move than part of a grand design for the reconstruction of the old "solidarity bloc" of 1879. Miquel certainly had a more ambitious political function in mind for the committee, and this was no doubt shared by some heavy-industrialist politicians, but its mere foundation represented no decisive junctüre of the interests of heavy industry and agriculture. At this stage it is difficult to detect a strong movement inside the CVDI for a new coalition with the agrarians on a political level. It is certainly misleading to talk in terms of a "formal alliance" ue .
It is clear that by the summer of 1897 a number of factors were combining to facilitate such a convergence. Well-established ideological affinities with the Conservatives, dissatisfaction with the disjointed pseudo-liberalism of the Hohenlohe administration, common antipathy to Social Democracy, and above all a shared interest in protecting the home market, were all pushing the leading elements in the CVDI towards an agreement with the agrarians m . In the context this could only take the form of a renegotiation of the Caprivi commercial treaties on a basis more favourable to the interests of agriculture, and a sharp political break with those sections of industry whidi had begun to identify their future prosperity with a continuation of the treaties. The hard political rationale behind such a coalition was the conviction that the only firm guarantee for the preservation of the iron tariff in the Reidistag was a coalescence of the twin movements of heavy-industrial and agrarian protection. This belief was reinforced by the fear that the light-industrial opponents of agrarian protection would also abolish the iron tariff if they had the diance. As the Secretary of the CVDI, Henry Axel Bueck, pointed out, the economic interests most heavily committed to the existing commercial treaties were precisely the ones which were also calling for a gradual, systematic dismantlement of heavy industry's own tariffs 11B . But although a mixture of economic and ideological solidarity was bringing heavy-industrialists and agrarians together in the summer of 1897, the countervailing forces were still strong. At the General Meeting of the Langnam-verein in Düsseldorf at the end of May 1897, for instance, Bueck was careful to warn the Bund der Landwirte (BdL) that heavy industry could never accept their maximum demands published the previous day. Although the CVDI recognised the need for higher grain tariffs, it refused to support the demand for constantly rising state-guaranteed grain prices or to abandon its commitment to commercial treaties of long duration. Any genuine rapprochement must depend upon concessions from both sides 119 .
A wide range of factors certainly created a propensity in heavy-industrialist circles to regard alliance with the agrarians as the natural expression of their interests: the dominant political and ideological climate under which German industrialisation took place, a shared interest in protecting the home market, a powerful cultural lag which helped obscure the direction of long-term class interests, above all the perception of a revolutionary threat from the organised working class. But this should not obscure the equally important points of conflict with the organised agrarian movement: the persistance in the latter of a strong anti-urban, anti-industrial and anti-capitalist ideology, different economic priorities, an opposing view of the labour market, and so on. In a period of accelerated industrialisation and vast social changes the two interests were inevitably separated by a wide variety of economic and ideological incompatibilities. The stability and internal cohesion of the heavy-industrialist alliance with the agrarians, both across a period of time and at any one point within that period, have almost certainly been overestimated. In many ways, in fact, the most striking feature of attempts to re-create the Bismarckian coalition between 1897 and 1902 was the fragility of the relationship between the CVDI and the organs of agrarian opinion. Moreover, an examination of the efficacy of Miquel's call to unity will reveal that this was considerably less successful than has previously been supposed.
Although the long-term objective of a new Sammlung was clearly the formulation of common perspectives for a new tariff settlement, the immediate priority was the provision of a central rallying-point for the forthcoming Reichstag elections, now set for June 1898. The continuing excesses of the BdL, however, and the angry response these inevitably provoked in liberal quarters, constituted a powerful obstacle to the realisation of this goal. The embryonic rapprochement in the Wirtschaftlicher Ausschuß between the CVDI and the moderate agrarians of the DLR would be of little effect unless it could liquidate this mutual hostility and produce a similar convergence of the Conservative and National Liberal Parties. The hostility of those exporting and manufacturing interests committed to the existing commercial treaties was to be expected, as was that of their left liberal ideologists. But the deep antagonism between these forces and the BdL also cut across the historical barriers between majority and left liberalism and extended in many areas deep into the National Liberal Party. One source of difficulty encountered by the incipient Sammlung, therefore, was the reluctance of the National Liberal Party to endanger its own internal cohesion by adopting the so-called "national" economic programme as the central plank in its election campaign. The failure to moderate the agitation of the BdL during the autumn and winter of 1897-98 only increased this reluctance, and the heavy-industrialist right-wing of the party was able to make little headway with its plans. When two spokesmen for the National Liberal national executive exhorted the dele-gates to a provincial conference in Magdeburg in February 1898 to give their support to higher grain tariffs, these tensions erupted into a series of bitter altercations throughout the entire party press 120 . The internal disquiet at the party leadership's apparent support for a dangerously ill-defined conciliation of the agrarians was threatening to become more serious. Accordingly, the tacticians of the heavy-industrialist right began to cover their rear. In mid-February Theodor v. Möller, leading National Liberal and member of the CVDI Ausschuß, stated in the Landtag that the future of industry's exports depended on "the binding of tariffs for a long period of time". Bueck made the same point in a long programmatic article in the Deutsche Industrie-Zeitung. He argued that "Industry will and must insist on the conclusion of tariff-treaties, i.e. on the binding of mutual tariff-scales for the longest time possible". He continued more ominously 121 :
"Industry will have to consider carefully whether under the given circumstances its most vital interests allow it to ally with agriculture or to follow the call for Sammlung before absolutely unquestionable evidence is available that agriculture does not intend to follow the agrarian leaders further in their hostility to industry." Moderate agrarians showed little success in restraining their extremist associates. Matters were complicated by the existence of a regionally important, independent antisemitic movement beginning to define itself in opposition to the Conservative Party. Strong tendencies in the BdL towards a juncture with this movement created mudi disquiet in a Conservative leadership trying to make the aspirations of Miquel's Sammlungspolitik into a party-political reality. The more undisciplined Diederich Hahn was playing a more prominent role in the national leadership of the BdL, and the logic of their own agitation was leading other leaders, sudi as Berthold v. Ploetz and Gustav Roesicke, to adopt a position on the tariff question far to the right of moderates like SdiwerinLöwitz, Limburg-Stirum and Manteuffel-Krossen 122 . In January 1898, for instance, Eduard Klapper, the BdL functionary, published an article in Deutsche Agrar-Zeitung, entitled "Bund or Manteuffel?", whidi posed explicitly the question of continued loyalty to the Conservative leadership 12S . The Conservative conference in Dresden on the 172. 2. 1898, the first since the Tivoli conference of 1893, brought little clarification 124 . Despite a show of unity, reports appeared a few days later that in the constituency of Minden-Lübbecke the BdL had decided to oppose the official Conservative candidate, Graf Roon, a known opponent of their extreme agitation, and had nominated their own man for the seat 125 . This was both a provocation and a clear warning to the Conservative leadership. It was confirmed at the BdL Congress when Hahn dealt another blow to hopes of a new Sammlung: after attacking the latter's programme as vague and general, with no concrete meaning, he declared that the BdL would negotiate with the parties only on the basis of its own economic demands 12e . In the light of the individualist position aggressively projected by the BdL in mid-February the political reality behind Sammlungspolitik was proving fairly tenuous. As Vorwärts commented with satisfaction: "In the end one can only rally (sammeln) along a blurred middle line, which will always little suit the extreme wings on the right and left 127 .° Sammlungspolitik, whidi emerged in 1897 as an attempt to reconstruct the fragmented links of the government with the Prussian Conservatives and to bring its policies back into consonance with the needs of the landowning class, was running into difficulties. Miquel's fundamental aim was a stabilisation of government by reembedding its priorities in that synthesis of interests whidi lay at the heart of the old Bismarckian coalition and the centre of the state -between "East" and "West", agriculture and industry, traditional and modern, feudal and bourgeois. The focus of his efforts in the long-term was the future tariff settlement, and the discussions between the CVDI and the DLR in 1897 were intended to lay the political foundations for a new protectionist front in the Reidistag. All alliances are forged from common efforts and mutual aid, however, and the first real test of the viability of sudi a parliamentary bloc was rapidly approadiing in the elections of 1898. This realisation was growing stronger by February 1898. Unless the whole strategy was merely to dissolve amidst the mutual recriminations of agrarian extremists and industrialists, right and left-wing National Liberals, a formula was needed to embody the "middle line" suggested by a Politik der Sammlung and to make possible the adherence of at least a section of the National Liberals without bringing the party's unity into question. The more perceptive of political observers were starting to argue that a "positive programme" must be found 128 . The main obstacle to an effective Sammlungspolitik, it seemed, was the absence of a concrete programme around whidi to rally 129 .
On the 25. 2. 1898 a meeting was convened in Berlin under the joint chairmanship of Ridiard v. Vopelius and Hans v. Schwerin-Löwitz
1S0
. Every member of the Wirtschaftlicher Ausschuß was invited except two -Wilhelm Herz ("the representative of the Berlin stock-exchange") and Carl Ferdinand Laeisz ("the presentative of Hamburg commerce") -since the chances of meaningful discussion with them were regarded as slight 1S1 . The meeting was attended by 18 members of the Wirtsdiaftlidier Ausschuß and five further representatives of the CVDI. This reflected the importance of the former in offering an institutional setting for the rapprodiement between heavy industry and agriculture, and many bitter remarks were passed by the left-liberal press about the political manipulation of the committee 132 . Vopelius, Schwerin-Löwitz, Möller and Franz v. Ballestrem met beforehand to draw up a manifesto -this was drafted by Möller and accepted by his colleagues with minor editorial revisions 1S3 . In its original form this contained two salient features. Firstly, it called for the discontinuation of the commercial treaties in their present form and the omission of the "mostfavoured-nation" clauses in any re-negotiation. Secondly, it announced a commitment to the pursuit of a "national" economic policy during the elections, "by the elimination of party-political conflicts". The aspiration to re-create the supraparty interest-coalition of the Bismarckian Sammlung was clearly present in this formula. However, an amendment tabled by three members of the Centre, objecting to the reference to the elimination of party-political differences, was accepted against the opposition of only three, who included both chairmen. This substituted a more orthodox statement -"within the individual political parties". The new formulation was, as Stegmann rightly comments, "a clear dilution", and its adoption was symptomatic of both the strength of existing party loyalties and the need to accommodate the Centre in any reconstruction of the Kartell 134 . A second amendment, tabled apparently by a leftliberal non-parliamentarian, proposed the deletion of the reference to the "mostfavoured-nation" clauses of the commercial treaties, but was defeated by 19 votes against only three. Both convenors then emphasised the purpose of the manifesto. It was not to set up "a fixed system for our future commercial relations abroad", but "merely... to bind more tightly together for the elections all supporters of the protection of the national labour (Schutz der nationalen Arbeit), who believe in the possibility of uniting the different productive estates, and who wish to further this in the country" 135 . Vopelius then asked who was willing to sign the manifesto on the spot. Eleven of those present agreed, including five agrarians. Of the remainder, one refused outright. The others made their signatures conditional on the assent of their parties, or reserved their decisions on general grounds. The meeting represented an overt attempt to translate the limited rapprochement in the Wirtschaftlidier Ausschuß into a party-political practice, to convert Miquel's statement of principle into a hard prescription for electoral success. Despite this new initiative, the passage of the Sammlung was still far from smooth. Difficulties emanated from the old sources -agrarian extremism, and the resultant alienation of National Liberals. On the 3. 3. 1898, for instance, in a provincial conference of the BdL in Königsberg, Hahn greeted the manifesto, or the Wirtschaftlicher Aufruf as it became known, as an accession to the BdL's own programme 13e . Nothing could be more calculated to alienate the left National Liberals, whose precondition for an electoral pact with the Conservatives was an unequivocal rejection of the agrarian demand for a Sammlung beneath the banner of the BdL. In these circumstances an attempt by left liberals to capitalise on National Liberal confusion was inevitable, and on the 3. 3. 1898 the Centralstelle zur Vorbereitung von Handelsverträgen issued a public statement alleging that the Wirtschaftlicher Ausschuß had been manipulated for party-political purposes by the agrarians. In order to rebuff these overtures to the party's dissident left-wing, and to salvage the tactical progress achieved by the meeting of 25. 2. 1898, Möller issued a public statement which both firmly rejected the statement of the Centralstelle and attacked the continuing sectionalism of the BdL 137 . He defended the meeting as an attempt to overcome unnecessary conflicts of interest in the name of common unity against the SPD. He attacked the BdL sharply and regretted that the efforts to call forth a conciliatory attitude on both sides had not yet born fruit. Though he had not given up hope, Möller could not append his signature to the manifesto unless firm guarantees were forthcoming from the BdL. On Hahn, Möller commented curtly: "With men of this kind, whose existence depends on their agitation and its continuation in the sharpest possible manner, no policy of Sammlung is possible." A more serious threat to the success of the manifesto came from within the very heart of West German heavy industry. On the 3. 3. 1898 the joint executives of the Langnamverein and the North-West Group of the Verein Deutscher Eisenund Stahl-Industrieller (VDEStI) met in Düsseldorf to consider their attitude to the manifesto 138 . Though they described it as "self-evident" that they supported the principle of Schutz der nationalen Arbeit, the joint executives followed the example of Möller and refused to support the manifesto without explicit guarantees that agriculture was willing to recognise the interests of industry in the negotiation of new commercial treaties 139 . Moreover, they also warned that the CVDI could not give its official support until this had been approved by a Delegate Conference. Naturally it is possible to detect a general sympathy for the aims of the manifesto in this area, but the controversy inside heavy industry over the signature of the document, and later the election campaigning in the constituencies, suggest that the commitment of the CVDI to a political alliance with agriculture was not quite as monolithic as has been claimed. It was of great significance, for instance, that Beumer and Möller set up a series of consultations within the National Liberal Party in order to allay the fears of the Langnamverein and the VDEStI. The National Liberal Party and not a new form of organised collaboration with agrarian Conservatives was still accepted by a majority of heavy-industrialists as >" National-Zeitung, 147, 4. 3. 1898. 1.8 Vopelius had sent out a circular on 1. 3. 1898 urging the affiliates and members of the CVDI to sign the manifesto, which was originaly to be published on the 7. 3. 1898. For a copy of this circular, see HA/GHH, 3001071/3. 1.9 Circular to the membership from Servaes and Beumer, Düsseldorf, 3. 3. 1898, copy ibid. 140 See Stegmann, p. 75. the most appropriate vehicle for their interests. The conscious association of the heavy-industrial interests with the party still reflected at this time basic antipathies with both traditional and agrarian conservatism. As Bueck pointed out during a later discussion of political loyalties, many of industry's achievements had been won only after a long struggle against Conservative opposition and any attempt to attadi the CVDI exclusively to either of the two Conservative parties would provoke a "storm of indignation". Thus, however unsatisfactory the existing liberal parties might be, Bueck argued, the CVDI must continue to recognise the strength of the "old, tried liberal philosophy on which the overwhelming majority of German industrialists stand" 141 . The old party loyalties, therefore, which themselves mediated important conflicts of ideology and interest within the ruling class, placed heavy constraints upon the ability of the Sammlungspolitiker to realise their aspirations. The concrete result of the disquiet expressed by the joint executives of the Langnamverein and the VDEStI was a meeting of the National Liberal executive on the 7. 3. 1898, together with the Reichstag and Landtag fraction committees and other leading party members, such as Möller and the leading exponents of its agrarian wing, Heyl zu Herrnsheim and Oriola. The formal object of the meeting was to remove public speculation concerning the party's attitude to the manifesto. The real aim, however, was the careful differentiation of the party's position from any attempt to deny the need for long-term commercial treaties. Armed with an official declaration to this effect, i.e. one whidi enshrined the principle which was missing from the manifesto, heavy-industrialists could sign the latter with a clear conscience. The heavy-industrialist politicians concentrated in the Landtag fraction, such as Möller, Bueck and Beumer, needed a formal statement by the party to stand as a rider to their signatures. This tactical reference-bads to the central organs of the National Liberal Party revealed both the primacy of the old affiliations and the internal tensions whidi were beginning to upset the party's unity. The scene was set at the very start of the meeting. Ernst v. Eynern, a leading supporter of the existing treaties, proposed that an explicit reference to the necessity of "most-favoured-nation° clauses in future commercial treaties be inserted in any party declaration 142 . Möller opposed this strongly, and then Heyl zu Herrnsheim intervened with Oriola to demand the total exclusion of any reference at all to long-term commercial treaties. A deadlock over details could only be avoided by confining the discussion and the ensuing declaration to a general statement of principle, and Rudolf v. Bennigsen, still the recognised authority in the leadership, saw this clearly. In a masterly exercise of tactical expertise, he converted what might have been an evasion of divisive issues into a statement of the general principles of National Liberalism, and succeeded, at least temporarily, in preserving the rather fragile unity of the party. In this way, he transformed a glaring source of weakness, the heterogenous interest base of the party, into an apparent source of strength -namely, a claim to represent the national rather than any single sectional interest. Bennigsen began by recommending the withdrawal of Eynern's motion. He stressed "the completely general principles for the co-operation" with agriculture, and argued that "in this discussion it was dangerous to enter into details". He continued: "We are a party which has so far excluded economic issues from its programme because from the very start we were, and hope to remain, a party which represented the most various of landscapes, in which first one and then the other interest would come more strongly to the fore. For this reason, therefore, we could not allow such matters to find a programmatic expression. Otherwise, we would lose sight of the principle that a large moderate liberal party can bring the differences among the people and their interests to a settlement more effectively than if they were represented by economic parties. We are against the domination of political life by economic issues. That would be the unhappiest of changes in our public life. Now we are representatives of the whole nation, then we would be the representatives of particular interests ..." However, Bennigsen did concede that economic issues of sudi importance had now been raised that an official declaration had become "unavoidable". In these circumstances the party's role should be "to apply a moderating influence and to reconcile". It was "in this sense that the question had been put to us by the Wirtschaftlicher Aufruf". The demands of agriculture were justified, and it was wrong to attack the agrarians for organising themselves. The government had taken a positive step in setting up the consultative committee as a forum for discussion. The manifesto was thus to be welcomed as an extension of the campaign for reconciliation, and many of the party's friends had already signed it. In accordance with Bennigsen's recommendations, which were decisive, a declaration was released that same day, expressing "approval for the general aim" of the manifesto, but also carrying two important qualifications. Firstly, it contained a clear refusal to allow "the independence of our party and the national, idealist and liberal ideas from which our party has grown, to be forced into the background". In other words, the National Liberal executive issued a clear statement that it would not allow the party to be supplanted by the kind of supra-party interest coalition implied by the Bismarckian protectionist front of 1879. Secondly, the statement pointed out that although the interests of agriculture should be better guaranteed in the renegotiation of the commercial treaties, the need of industry and trade for treaties of long duration must also be taken into account 143 .
This National Liberal declaration was crucial for the heavy industry of the Rhein-Ruhr. On the day after its release Beumer and Bueck sent a copy to the executives of the Langnamverein and the North-West Group of the VDEStI, expressing the belief that it had successfully removed the objections to signing the manifesto. The action had its effect, for on the 10. 3. 1898 Beumer and August Servaes, respectively the Secretary and Chairman of the two organisations, informed their membership that the objections had disappeared, for the National Liberal declaration could in future be used as a point of reference in any discussions with the agrarians 144 . The manifesto was duly published on the 11. 3. 189 8 145 . In all it attracted about 1500 signatures. They included every member of the CVDI Board except Emil Russell. Most significant heavy-industrialists signed it. In general, those industries organised in the CVDI were strongly represented -iron, steel, coal, glass, sugar and textiles. The leading moderate agrarians were also present -Sdiwerin-Löwitz, Limburg-Stirum, Manteuffel-Krossen, Mirbach-Sorquitten, Roon etc. Hahn, Roesicke and Ploetz also signed, but continued to contravene the terms of the manifesto in their political practice. The manifesto performed its function most effectively in West Germany and Saxony 14e . However, these were also the regions in which a longstanding co-operation between industry and agriculture, National Liberals and Conservatives, made a rallying action least necessary. In a purely formal sense, the manifesto fulfilled its objective, in that it was able to bring together on paper large numbers of representatives of industry, agriculture and the Mittelstand, from every region of the Reich, and from all political parties to the right of the left liberals. This front was apparently sealed in the Landtag on the 4. 3. 1898, when Kanitz, Sdiwerin-Löwitz, Kardorff, Möller, Bueck and Ballestrem all joined hands to call for a co-operative approach to the problem of new commercial treaties, leaving the left liberals Rickert and Brömel to carry the torch for an expansive export policy 147 . The signature of Bismarck, moreover, conferred upon the new front an ultimate legitimacy 148 .
IV
The discussions around the Wirtschaftlicher Aufruf, therefore, revealed the difficulties of forming a new Sammlung in the face of conflicting economic needs, the tenacity of old party loyalties and the hostile ideologies of agrarians and industrial bourgeoisie. The greatest single obstacle to the elaboration of an effective Sammlungspolitik in 1897 and the following decade was the primacy of the existing party-political framework. One heavy-industrialist supporter of the manifesto had complained bitterly that the National Liberal Party was opposing a union of all "national* forces from a "fear of losing importance", and concluded that "the political parties are opposed to reconciliation, for their very existence is dependent on the conflict of the parties" 148a . These remarks reflected an appreciation of the fact that in the final resort an effective Sammlung could only be built on the destruction of the existing party framework, but at the same time displayed a militant refusal to admit that the party divisions represented equally sharp conflicts of interest. A meaningful unity of the right would only be achieved within a unitary organisational framework, but at the same time such a radical re-grouping of forces could only take place once the old organisations had been left redundant by profound changes in the objective conditions. The reaction of National Liberals to the issue of the manifesto had shown this clearly. Of a total of 118 National Liberal Reichstag and Landtag deputies, moreover, only 55 signed the manifesto. Those who refused included Bennigsen, Brunck, Bueck, Clemm, Eynern, Hammadier, Hobredit, Krause, Krawinkel, Osann and Schweckendieck. Stegmann identifies this group with the economic interests who felt themselves excluded and threatened by the nascent Sammlung, but to a great extent this misses the point 14B . As Bennigsen's address to the crucial meeting of 7. 3. 1898 had indicated, important groups of National Liberals perceived in the issue of the manifesto an attempt to convert the party into a political dependent of West German industry 150 . Stegmann has described the development of these fears after 1909 in considerable detail, but in 1897-98 they were equally strong and able, in fact, to animate individuals who would later dismiss them 151 .
A close analysis of the course of German politics between the ministerial changes of June-July 1897 and the elections of 1898, and even more clearly between 1898 and the elections of 1903, will reveal that a strategy of Sammlung had only a limited success. The striking feature of the elections of 1898, in fact, was the disunity of the bourgeois parties rather than the existence of any 'solid phalanx" 152 , of the mutual recriminations of agrarians and industrialists rather than their co-operation against the SPD. On the very day of the manifesto's publication wide cracks had appeared in the newly-formed front. An agrarian resolution in the Reidistag calling for the exclusion of foreign textiles from subsidised shipping led to sharp exchanges. Posadowsky felt moved to warn the agrarians that they were endangering the success of the rapprochement by this threat to the textile industry, and Carl Ferdinand v. Stumm became involved in an angry altercation with the supporters of the motion. The National Liberals were forced into a common front with the left liberals and Social Democrats in order to defeat the measure
15S
. Within a week fresh news of trouble was arriving. Stumm, one of the most consistant advocates of a new Kartell, was being opposed in his own constituency by Roesicke 154 , and the BdL had put up an independent candidate against the sitting National Liberal in Hameln, where Hahn was already conducting an incontinent agitation 1S5 . Moreover, Graf Dohna-Wundlaken and Graf Dönhoff-Friedrichstein, both of whom had signed the manifesto, were opposing each other in the same constituency as Conservative and BdL candidates 1δβ . As the election campaigning moved into full swing more extensive conflicts broke out. In two of the firmest National Liberal strongholds, Pfalz and Hannover, the BdL intervened on a large scale and placed National Liberal candidates under massive pressure. Where the latter refused to commit themselves to the BdL programme, independent BdL candidates were nominated 157 normally the most vigorous defender of the Sammlung, attacked the leaders of the BdL for destroying the foundations of a united front, and complained that "in many places the basic principle of the Sammlung has virtually disappeared in disputes over the details of economic policy" 15e . The elections of 1898 were characterised by the BdL's ruthless pursuit of its own maximum demands, its disruption of previously stable National Liberal preserves, its frequent support of Antisemites against National Liberals and even Conservatives, and in general its subversion of a national Sammlungspolitik around the Wirtschaftlicher Aufruf. The only areas in which large-scale splitting was avoided were those where the hegemony of a particular party made intervention pointless -the Conservative strongholds east of the Elbe, the vast preserves of the Centre in Bavaria, Rheinland and Westfalen, and a range of individual constituencies with local peculiarities. The only areas in which the protectionist axis proved strong enough to support meaningful co-operation between the Kartell parties were those such as the Ruhr or Saxony, where such unity was long established 1β0 . Moreover, one of the greatest failures of the strategy was its inability to strike up a form of co-operation with the Centre Party during the elections 1β1 . In the number of deputies actually returned, Miquel's policy was a demonstrable failure: the Conservative representation sank from 72 to 56, the Free Conservative from 28 to 23, the National Liberal from 53 to 46, and even these figures included a large number of deputies who had never fully committed themselves to the principle of Sammlung. As suggested above, there are serious misunderstandings at large concerning both the nature of heavy industry's interest in a new Sammlungspolitik and its willingness to participate in one. Quite apart from the paucity of detailed evidence regarding the position of individuals and specific concerns, one of the factors inhibiting an understanding of this question was the absence of any uniformity of response within the heavy-industrial interest. Even amongst relatively convinced exponents of the Sammlung there was still great disagreement over the precise form it should take and the sacrifices worth making to achieve it. Theodor Reismann-Grone, for instance, stood at one extreme. Operating from within a Pan-German perspective, he wished to go far beyond the institutionalised Sammlung which already existed in Essen and other Ruhr constituencies, "» Cited by Vorwärts, 98, 28. 4. 1898. A few days later Berliner Neueste Nachrichten launched a further attack on the BdL for demanding that candidates give unconditional support to "a programme which conflicts in many points with the most important life-needs of German industry" (cited by Volksstimme, Mannheim, 51, 5. 5. 1898).
